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Abstract
Nash equilibria of all-pay auctions are studied when players cost
functions are known but nonlinear. A complete closed form charac-
terization of the Þrst price all-pay auction and a partial closed form
characterization of the second price all-pay auction is provided. In
both cases, a closed form formula of sellers revenues is derived. With
linear cost functions the revenue maximizing equilibrium of the Þrst
price all-pay auction is at least as proÞtable as that of the second price
all-pay auction, and the regular action lies in between. In asymmetric
case this order is strict. With quadratic cost function the order of the
Þrst price all-pay action and the second price all-pay action may be re-
versed, and both generate a higher revenues than the regular auctions.
Keywords: All-pay auctions, closed form characterization, revenue
comparisons.
JEL: D44, D72.
1 Introduction
An all-pay auction is an auction game where the player putting forth the
greatest eﬀort wins the prize while the others go unrewarded. All-pay auc-
tions capture the essential features of a contest, and they are pertinent
to a large class of economically interesting situations, e.g. tournaments,
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rent-seeking, R&D-race, lobbying, advertising, political campaining, animal
conßicts. Understanding the structure of equilibria of all-pay auctions is
important from the perspective of general economic modelling. This paper
collects together a number of new results on all-pay auctions.
The two most prominent auctions in this class are the Þrst pay all-pay
auction and the second price1 all-pay auction. In the former case, the win-
ner pays his own bid, and in the latter, he pays the second highest bid.
All other bidders pay their own bids. Whereas the analysis of standard
auction models is trivial in the complete information case, equilibria of the
all-pay auctions are much more diﬃcult to characterize since the resulting
equilibria are in nondegenrate mixed strategies. Even if the equilibria in
the standard linear case are well studied,2 little is known about structure of
the Nash equilibria when players payoﬀ functions are nonlinear. Also rev-
enue properties of the auctions are not completely understood. This paper
focuses on all-pay auctions under complete information. Equilibria of the
all-pay auctions with more general payoﬀ functions are characterized, and
characterizations are used to compare auctions revenue-wisely.
First, a complete closed form characterization of the Þrst price all-pay
auction is provided. Let there be n ≥ 2 bidders bidding for an object of value
1. Costs functions are of form ψiy(·), where y is an increasing and continuous
function3 and ψi > 0, i = 1, ..., n, such that ψ1 ≤ ψ2 ≤ ... ≤ ψn. Then there
is a unique equilibrium if and only if ψ2 < ψ3. In such equilibrium, 1 and
2 randomize continuously on [0, y−1(ψ−12 )], and bidders 3, ..., n bid 0 with
probability one. If ψ2 = ψ3, then there is a continuum of equilibria. We give
explicit characterizations of these in terms of function y and parameters
(ψ1, ...,ψn). The characterization builds on Baye at.al. (1993, 1996), who
focus on the case where y is linear.
Second, we construct a partial closed form characterization of the sec-
ond price all-pay auction. As argued by Hendricks et.al. (1988), only Nash
equilibria with nondegenerate mixed strategies meet the additional restric-
tion of the subgame perfection in the war of attrition game. We focus on
such equilibria. We characterize a necessary condition for completely mixed
equilibria, and also a distinct but closely connected suﬃcient condition.
We also establish a closed form formula of sellers revenues in the Þrst
and second price all-pay auctions. Together with the equilibrium charcter-
izations, these permits us to conduct revenue comparisons. We conjecture
that the revenue rankings of auctions is the main contribution of the paper.4
1Whose dynamic version is also known as the war of attrition.
2See Baye et.al. 1993, 1996, and references therein. Important contributions include
Hillman and Riley 1989, Hendricks et.al. 1988, and Moulin 1986.
3Equivalently, we could assume that bidders share the same cost function γ but disagree
of the value of the prize c−1i . With the restriction γ(b) = b, this would coincide with Baye
at.al. (1986) assumptions.
4Krishna and Morgan (1997) analyze all-pay auction in the incomplete information
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It is shown that with linear cost functions the revenue maximizing equi-
librium of the Þrst price auction is always at least as proÞtable as that of the
second price auction, and that the standard actions lie in between. In the
asymmetric case (bidders marginal costs diﬀer), this order is strict. Thus
the revenue equivalence between the auctions does not hold.5 From the
perspective of Myerson (1981), this is due to the non-eﬃciency of all-pay
auctions: equilibrium strategies contain randomization and, hence, cannot
guarantee the most eﬃcient allocation of the prize. To our knowledge, this
revenue ranking of auctions under complete information has gone unnoticed
in the previous literature.
We also show that with convex cost functions (or, equivalently, risk
averse bidders) the revenue ordering of the Þrst price all-pay action and the
second price all-pay action may be reversed. In particular, with common
quadratic cost function, the two-player Þrst price all-pay auction generates
higher revenues than the second price all-pay auction, and both the all-pay
auctions generate higher revenues than the standard auctions. Heuristically,
the reason for the latter eﬀect is that for all bids b ≤ β, where ψy(β) = 1,
it follows from convexity of y that y(b) ≤ b. This implies, by the zero-proÞt
constraint of the bidders, that the probability of player i winning with bid
b in the Þrst price all-pay auction must be lower under convex than linear
y. Roughly, this can be true only if other bidders strategies (Þrst order)
stochastically dominate in the convex case those in the linear case. Stochas-
tic dominance in turn implies higher expected values of the bids, and hence
greater expected revenues.
Finally, we show that equilibrium proÞts of the Þrst price all-pay auction
under large number of symmetric bidders and exponential cost functions can
be characterized in a parsimonious way: as the number of bidders become
large, sellers proÞts tend to the exponential of the cost function. This result
should be handy in applications.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the set up. In
Section 3, the characterizations of the Þrst and second price all-pay auctions
are derived. Section 4 conducts some comparisons between the auctions.
In Section 5, some additional remarks are made on the properties of the
auctions, and concluding lines are provided.
scenario á la Milgrom and Weber (1982). Krishna-Morgan focus on ex ante symmetric
case, and impose conditions to the bidders signal structure that prevent signals being too
aﬃliated. These properties allow them focus equilibria with pure stratgies. However, they
restrict us from applying the Krishna-Morgan results to the current set up.
5Baye et.al. (1986) show that the equilibria of the Þrst price all-pay auction are not
revenue equivalent, and they specify the most proÞtable equilibrium. We show that the
argument extends to the non-linear case as well.
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2 The Set Up
There is an indivisible object to be allocated to {1, ..., n} := N players,
bidders. Bidder is utility depends two ways on all bidders actions: al-
location of the object and transfers are contingent on all bidder actions.
Bidder is action space is R+ with a typical element bi. DeÞne alloca-
tion rule s = (s1, ..., sn) : Rn+ → {0, 1}n such that
P
si(b) = 1, for all
b = (b1, ..., bn) ∈ Rn+. Given b, the object is devoted to bidder i iﬀ si(b) = 1.
A transfer rule is a mapping t = (t1, ..., tn) : Rn+ → Rn+, specifying a transfer
from each bidder which is contingent on the joint action b. Pair (s, t) is
called an auction.
We focus on auctions that allocate the cake to the highest bidder. Let
M(b) := argmax
i
{bi}.
Then
si(b) =
1
#M(b)
, if i ∈M(b),
si(b) = 0, if i /∈M(b).
The two all-pay auctions diﬀer in terms of how transfers are determined.
Denote by b(2) the second order statistics of sample b1, ...bn.
 First price all-pay auction (FPAA):
ti(b) = bi, for all i ∈ N.
 Second price all-pay auction (SPAA):6 .
ti(b) =
b(2)
#M(b)
, if i ∈M(b),
ti(b) = bi, if i /∈M(b).
The corresponding standard auction forms are similar with the exception
that ti(b) = 0 if i /∈M(b). Thus, the diﬀerence between all-pay and standard
auctions is that in the former case bidders are required to pay even if they
do not win the auction whereas in the latter case they are not.
Function ci : [0, 1]→ R+ describes the value of utility loss from transfer
ti ∈ R+. We mostly focus on the case where
ci(t) = ψiy(t), for all t ∈ R+, and for all i = 1, ..., n, (1)
6The second price all-pay auction is known also as the war of attrition.
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where ψ1, ...,ψn are positive scalars, and y(·) is a nondecreasing, continuous,
and diﬀerentiable function, and satisÞes y(0) = 0, limt→∞ y(t) =∞. With-
out loss, assume ψ1 ≤ ψ2 ≤ ... ≤ ψn. Given payment vector t = (t1, ..., t2),
bidder is payoﬀ is of quasilinear form ui(b) = si(b)− ci(ti). Hence, bidders
payoﬀ from wealth is separable from the consumption of the prize. Possible
nonlinearity of y(·) allows for risk aversion: convexity of y implies concav-
ity of ui in −t.7 Thus, if y is convex (linear, concave) then i is risk averse
(neutral, loving resp.) with respect to his wealth.
Denote by Σ1, ...,Σn a collection of independent cumulative distribution
functions on Rn+ that are interpreted as bidders strategies. Let Si be the
support of Σi.8 If Si = R+, then strategy Σi is completely mixed. With bid
bi and other bidders strategies Σ−i = (Σj)j 6=i, bidder is expected payoﬀ is
Eui(bi,Σ−i) =
Z
Rn−1+
[si(b)− ci(ti(b))] dΣ−i(b−i)
=
Y
j 6=i
Σj(bi)−
Z
Rn−1+
ci(ti(b))dΣ−i(b−i).
Choices are made simultaneously. Strategy Σ = (Σ1, ...,Σn) constitutes a
Nash equilibrium if and only if
Eui(Σ) ≥ Eui(bi,Σ−i), for all bi ∈ R+, i ∈ N.
With bids b = (b1, ..., bn), sellers payoﬀ is v(b) =
P
ti(b). Since strategies
are independent, his expected revenues are
Ev(Σ) =
nX
i=1
Z
R+
ti(b)dΣi(b).
3 Characterizations
3.1 First price all-pay auction
First we focus on the Þrst price all-pay auction. Hillman and Riley (1989)
and Baye et.al (1996), provide a thorough analysis of the linear cost func-
tions case. They show that in any Nash equilibrium buyer 1 extracts payoﬀ
(ψ2 − ψ1)ψ−12 ,9 while all other bidders get zero. In particular, Baye et.al.
(1996) show that there is a continuum of equilibria, and that these equilibria
diﬀer revenue-wisely.
7Suppose γ is twisely diﬀerentiable. Let w = w0 − t denote agents wealth, with initial
wealth w0 and transfer t. Then dui(s,w)/dw = ciγ0(w0 − w) and d2ui(s,w)/(dw)2 =
−ciγ00(w0 −w), for all w. This implies that ui is concave in w only if γ is convex in t.
8The smallest closed set Si such that Σi(b)−Σi(b+ ε) > 0, for all ε > 0, for all b ∈ Si.
9Baye at.al. (1986) assume identical (linear) cost functions but allow diﬀerent reserva-
tion valuations. Their and our approaches are isomorphic.
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We show that the Baye et.al. characterization extends in a natural way
to the non-linear case. The main contribution of the section is to charac-
terize the equilibria and revenues in a closed form, i.e. in terms of buyers
cost functions only. This facilitates revenue comparisons of the auctions,
conducted in the next section.
Under (1), denote by β = y−1(ψ−12 ) the break-even bid for bidder 2,
assuming this bid wins with probability one. Let m be the largest integer
such that ψm ≤ ψ2, and write
ci(b) =
 ci(b) +
ψ2 − ψ1
ψ2
, for i = 1,
ci(b), for all i = 2, ..., n.
If ψ1 = ψ2, then (c1, ..., cn) = (c1, ..., cn). The following proposition (see
appendix for the proof) completely characterizes the set of equilibria under
these conditions.
Proposition 1 Assume (1). Strategy (Σi)ni=1 constitutes a NE of the FPAA
if and only if there is a permutation of agents {2, ...,m} and numbers 0 =
λ1 = λ2 ≤ λ3 ≤ ... ≤ λm ≤ λm+1 = ... = λn = β such that, for all
k = 2, ...,m,
for all b ∈ (λk,λk+1], Σi(b) =
ci(b)
Qk−1
j=1
cj(b)
ci(b)Qm
j=k+1 αj(0)

1
k−1
, for all i = 1, ..., k,
(2)
for all b ∈ [0,λk+1], Σi(b) = αi(0), for all i = k + 1, ..., n,
where the size of is atom αi(0) at 0, i = 2, ..., n, is deÞned recursively by
αk(0) = c1(λm+1)
1
m = 1, for all k = m+ 1, ..., n, (3)
αk(0) =
Ã
c1(λk)Qm
j=k+1 αj(0)
! 1
k−1
, for all k = 2, ...,m.
By Proposition 1, any player i imposes an atom αi(0) on bid 0, and
mixes continuously on (λi,β]. In any equilibrium, bidder 1 earns payoﬀ (ψ2−
ψ1)/ψ2 and others earn zero payoﬀ. To see where the precise functional form
(2) of the strategies comes from, note that if all 1, 2, ..., k bidders mix at b,
then Y
j 6=i
Σj(b)− ci(b) = 0, for all i ∈ {1, ..., k}. (4)
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Consequently
Σj(b) =
µ
ci(b)
cj(b)
¶
Σi(b), for all i, j ∈ {1, ..., k}.
Inserting back to (4)
Y
j 6=i
Σj(b) = Σi(b)
k−1
kY
j=1
j 6=i
ci(b)
cj(b)
nY
j=k+1
Σj(b) = ci(b), for all i ∈ {1, ..., k}.
Dividing and rearranging
Σi(a) =
ci(b) kY
j=1
j 6=i
cj(b)
ci(b)
nY
j=k+1
1
Σj(b)

1
k−1
, for all i ∈ {1, ..., k}.
By noting that if j = k + 1, ..., n does not mix on (0,λi], then Σj(b) is
equivalent to the atom αj(0). Thus (2) is induced.
A major part of the proof is devoted to arguing that (i) bidder 1 ran-
domizes continuously on interval [0,β], (ii) some bidder i randomizes con-
tinuously on interval (0,β] and imposes an atom of size αi(0) on 0, (iii) any
player j ∈ {2, ...,m} \ {i} randomizes continuously on some interval (λi,β],
λi ∈ [0, 1), and imposes atom of size αj(0) on 0, (iv) all bidders get zero
proÞt. Baye et.al. (1996) proved in the linear case that the equilibria meets
these conditions. The key contribution of Proposition (1) is the closed form
characterization of the strategies.
By Proposition 1, the generic case ofm = 2 induces a unique equilibrium
where players 1 and 2 randomize on [0,β] such that
Σ1(b) = c2(b) and Σ2(b) = c1(b), for all b ∈ [0,β]. (5)
Player 2s atom at 0 satisÞes α2(0) = Σ2(0) = c1(0) =
ψ2 − ψ1
ψ2
, and player
is, i = 3, ..., n, atom at 0 satisÞes αi(0) = Σi(0) = 1. Thus the latter ones
bid 0 with probability 1.
Now we turn to the sellers revenues. Denote sellers expected revenues
under the Þrst price all-pay auction by Evf
Proposition 2 Let (Σi)ni=1 constitute a NE of FPAA. Then the expected
payoﬀ to the seller is
Evf = βm−
mX
i=1
Z β
0
Σi(b)db. (6)
7
Proof. Recall that Σi is diﬀerentiable almost everywhere and hence
admits density σi on (0,β]. The expected transfer from i is now obtained by
integrating by parts (note that bid b = 0 results in 0 payment),
Eti =
Z β
0
σi(b)bdb+ 0 · Σi(0)
= β
Z β
0
σi(b)db−
Z β
0
Z a
0
σi(b)dadb
= β(Σi(β)−Σi(0))−
Z β
0
(Σi(b)−Σi(0))da
= βΣi(β)−
Z β
0
Σi(b)da.
Noting that Σi(β) = 1 for all i = 2, ...,m, we have, by summing over bidders,
Evf =
mX
i=1
Eti
= βm−
mX
i=1
Z β
0
Σi(b)da.
Property (6) reveals that if Σi Þrst order stochastically dominates Σ0i
for all i = 1, ..., n, then the seller prefers (Σi)ni=1 over (Σ
0
i)
n
i=1. Eﬀects if the
parameter changes may be surprising. Rewrite 5 in the form
Σ1(b) = ψ2y(b) and Σ2(b) =
ψ2 − ψ1
ψ2
+ψ1y(b) = 1+ψ1(y(b)−y(β)), for all b ∈ [0,β].
Since y(b) < y(β) for all b < β, an increase in ψ1 induces a new strategy for 2
which stochastically dominates the original strategy while leaving the other
strategies unaﬀected. Thus such change unambigiously increases sellers
payoﬀs. The explanation for this eﬀect is that higher marginal costs of the
low cost bidder indeces more Þerce competition between 1 and 2 and induces
them to bid more agressively. However, while an increase in ψ2 induces a
new strategy for 2 which stochastically dominates the original strategy while
leaving the other strategies unaﬀected it also induces a new strategy for 1
which is stochastically dominated by the original strategy. By Proposition 2,
the total eﬀect remains unclear. More formally, the after some manipulation,
sellers payoﬀs in the generic case can be written in the form
Evf = (ψ1 + ψ2)
Z β
0
(y(β)− y(b)) db
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An important corollary of this is that reducing the number of random-
izing bidders increases sellers proÞts. Thus in the optimal equilibrium only
bidders 1 and 2 randomize. This is established in the following proposition.10
Proposition 3 In the most proÞtable NE of the FPAA only 1 and 2 are
active.
Proof. Let bidders 2, ...,m randomize in the Nash equilibrium. Then
λk−1 < λk < λk+1 = β. We show that Evf increases in λk. As all Σis are
continuous, increase in λk only aﬀects through the direct eﬀect on αk(0) =
c1(λk)
k−1. We have
dαk(0)
dλm
= (k − 1)c1y0(λk)c1(λk)k−2 > 0.
On the other hand, by (2),
dΣi(b)
dαk(0)
< 0, for all i = 1, ..., k.
Thus,
dEvf
dλm
= − d
dλm
mX
i=1
Z β
0
Σi(b)da = −
mX
i=1
Z β
0
dαk(0)
dλm
dΣi(b)
dαk(0)
da > 0
Since this is true for any k > 2, and in any NE k is at least 2, it follows that
in the optimum k = 2.
Thus in the most proÞtable equilibrium of the Þrst price all-pay auction,
bidders 1 and 2 completely mix on [0,β], and all the other bidders bid 0.
When comparing maximally proÞtable equilibria of the two all-pay auctions,
it suﬃces to conÞne attention to such simple equilibrium.
3.2 Second price all-pay auction
Now we focus on the second price all-pay auction, whose equilibria are much
more diﬃcult to characterize than those of the Þrst price all-pay auction. In
the n ≥ 3 bidders case, only a partial characterization is provided. First we
characterize a necessary and a suﬃcient condition for any completely mixed
equilibrium (proof in the appendix).
Proposition 4 Assume (1). There is a NE of SPAA where m bidders
completely mix only if these bidders constitute set {k + 1, ..., k + m} for
10Baye et. al. (1996) prove the result in the linear case.
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some k ∈ {1, ..., n−m} such that ψk = ... = ψk+m−1 ≤ ψk+m, and
Σi(b) =
(1− e−ci(b))Y
j 6=i
1− e−cj(b)
1− e−ci(b)
 1m−1 , for all b ∈ R+, for all i = k+1, ..., k+m.
(7)
In particular, such NE exists for k = 0.
Hendricks at.al. (1988) point out that the second price all-pay auction
always hosts an asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium where bidder 1 bids
b ≥ β and all other players bid 0. However, they argue that such Nash
equilibrium is never subgame perfect in the dynamic version of the game,
where bidders continue to raise their bids until they are the sole contestants
(the war of attrition). We do not argue
We now turn to sellers revenues. Denote the expected payoﬀ for the
seller by Evs.
Proposition 5 Let (Σi)ni=1 constitute a completely mixed NE of the SPAA.
The expected revenue to the seller is
Evs =
nX
i=1
Z ∞
0
e−ci(b) (1−Σi(b)) db. (8)
Proof. The expected transfer of bidder i submitting bid ai is
Eti(ai) =
Z ai
0
bdGi(b) + ai(1−Gi(ai)).
On the other hand, since Eti(ai) is diﬀerentiable almost everywhere,
Eti(ai) =
Z ai
0
dEti(b) + Eti(0).
Nothing that Eti(0) = 0 and combining the other two expressions,
Eti(ai) =
Z ai
0
(1−Gi(b))db
=
Z ai
0
e−ci(b)db.
The expected transfer of bidder i is then
Eti =
Z ∞
0
Eti(ai)dΣi(ai)
=
Z ∞
0
Z a
0
e−ci(b)dbσi(a)da.
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This yields, by integrating by parts,
Eti =
Z ∞
0
e−ci(b)dbΣi(∞)−
Z ∞
0
e−ci(b)Σi(b)db
=
Z ∞
0
e−ci(b) (1−Σi(b)) db.
Since bids are independent,
Evs =
X
i
Eti
=
X
i
Z ∞
0
e−ci(b) (1−Σi(b)) db,
as required by (8).
In the general case, sellers payoﬀs under SPAA are diﬃcult to analyse
and compare to FPAA.. However, in special cases this can be done. This is
the theme of the next section.
4 Revenue comparisons
4.1 Linear cost functions
In this section, we make the assumption of linear cost functions. However,
we allow asymmetries. Assume that y(b) = b for all i. Then β = 1/ψ2 and
c1(β) = ψ1/ψ2.
Proposition 6 With linear cost function, the revenue maximizing NE of
the SPAA is at least as proÞtable to the seller as the revenue maximizing
NE of the FPAA, with strict inequality when ψ1 < ψ2.
Proof. Recall that β = 1/ψ2. By Propositions 7 and 3, the expected
payoﬀ from the most proÞtable NE of the FPAA is
Evf = β(1 + c1(β))−
Z β
0
(ψ1 + ψ2)bdb
=
2
ψ2
−
Z 1/c2
0
µ
(ψ1 + ψ2)b+
µ
1− ψ1
ψ2
¶¶
db
=
1
ψ2
µ
2− ψ1 + ψ2
2ψ2
¶
− ψ2 − ψ1
ψ22
=
ψ1 + ψ2
2ψ22
. (9)
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By Propositions 4 and 5, there is a completely mixed NE of the SPAA,
whose expected revenue can be written
Evs = 2
Z ∞
0
e−(ψ1+ψ2)bdb
=
2
ψ1 + ψ2
. (10)
Denote the average marginal cost by ψ¯ = (ψ1 + ψ2)/2. Then ψ2 ≥ ψ¯ ≥ ψ1.
Now
Evs =
1
ψ¯
≥ β ≥ β ψ¯
ψ2
= Evf , (11)
with strict inequalities when ψ2 > ψ1.
Thus, with linear cost function the revenue maximizing second price all-
pay auction is at least as proÞtable for the seller as the Þrst price all-pay
auction, and strictly more proÞtable if the lowest marginal cost is strictly
lower than the second smallest. Roughly, the reason for this is that the Þrst
price all-pay auction necessarily permits bidder number 1 to gain surplus
of value (ψ2 − ψ1)/ψ2 whereas the second price all-pay auction extracts all
the surplus from all bidders. To our notice, this revenue diﬀerence has gone
unnoticed in the previous literature.
From (9) and (10) it is easy to deduce that an increase in c1 contributes
positively to the expected revenues of the Þrst price all-pay auction but neg-
atively to those of the second price all-pay auction. Thus decrease in c1
increases the revenue gap between the two auctions. When ψ1 = 0, the ex-
pected revenue from the second price all-pay auction is 2β, and from the Þrst
price all-pay auction β/2, constituting a revenue gap of 3β/2. This means
that the revenue diﬀerence between the auctions always lies in [0, 3β/2]. Note
that as ψ2 goes to zero, the upper bound of this interval goes to inÞnity.
It is interesting to compare the all-pay auctions to the standard ones.
Under full information, the analysis of standard auctions is straightforward.
In the unique (trembling hand) perfect equilibrium the good is sold to the
buyer who is willing to pay the most for the object, i.e. the bidder with
the lowest marginal cost equal to the break-even price of bidder with the
second lowest marginal cost. Such outcome constitutes the unique Nash
equilibrium of the Þrst price auction, and is equivalent with the dominant
strategy Nash equilibrium of the latter11 The payoﬀ to the seller from the
two auctions is β. In a symmetric case, the seller extracts all the surplus.
In such equilibrium the seller gains the monetary value of the prize. This
paper argues that such revenue equivalence does not extend to the all-pay
auctions. On the other hand, it is easy to see that the any (trembling hand)
11Assuming that in the Þrst price auction ties are broken in favor of the player with the
lowest marginal cost.
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perfect equilibrium of the standard Þrst price and second price auction forms
generate seller payoﬀ equal to β. Thus, from (11) it follows that the auctions
can be ranked by their proÞtability as follows:
Corollary 1 With linear cost functions, FPAA, SPAA, and standard auc-
tion(s) are ranked by their most proÞtable (trembling hand) NE in the fol-
lowing order: 1. FPAA, 2. standard auctions, 3. SPAA. Decrease in ψ1
increases the revenue diﬀerences between the auctions.
Intuitively, the reason why the Þrst price allpay auction generates lower
proÞt than the standard ones is due to the fact that in the Þrst price all-
pay auction randomization causes ineﬃciencies when marginal costs diﬀer.
Hence the extractable payoﬀ is lower under the Þrst price all-pay auction
than under standard auctions.
4.2 Two bidders - convex cost functions
It is easy to verify that the aforementioned characterizations can be extended
to cover general increasing and diﬀerentiable (a.e.) cost functions when there
are two bidders.
Proposition 7 Let n = 2 and let c1 and c2 be continuous and increasing
functions. (i) In the unique NE of the FPAA, Σi(b) = cj(b), for i, j = 1, 2,
i 6= j. (ii) In the unique completely mixed NE of the SPAA, Σi(b) = 1 −
e−cj(b), for i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
For proof of part (ii), the reader is referred to Hendricks et.al. (1988).
They also show that the completely mixed Nash equilibrium is only one that
satisÞes subgame perfection in the war of attrition -version of the game.
Denote by Evf2 and Evs2 the expected revenue generated to the seller under
the two auctions when the two bidders obey Nash equilibria characterized
by Proposition 7.
The expected revenues of the seller can now be written:
Corollary 2 If n = 2, then
Evf2 = β(1 + c1(β))−
Z β
0
(c1(b) + c2(b))db,
Evs2 = 2
Z ∞
0
e−c1(b)−c2(b)db.
Thus the sellers payoﬀ under the two auction depends only of the average
cost function of the two bidders. General revenue comparisons are hard but
in the particular case of quadratic cost functions we can say more.
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Example 1 Let c1(b) = c2(b) = b2 for all b. Then β = 1 and
Evf2 = 2−
Z 1
0
2b2db =
4
3
,
Evs2 = 2
Z ∞
0
e−2b
2
db =
r
π
2
.
Therefore, Evf2 > Evs2.
Thus the Þrst price all-pay auction is more proÞtable in the symmetric
quadratic case, to the contrary of the asymmetric linear case. The intuition
is as follows. With symmetric buyers the buyers receive the object with the
same probability in the two auctions. In the Þrst price auction, this is the
only uncertainty a buyer faces. However, in the second price auction he is
also unaware of the price he is about to pay. Since he is risk averse, the same
average expected payment from a bidder is more costly for the bidder in the
second price auction. Thus the zero-payoﬀ condition implies he is willing to
bid less aggressively in the second price auction.
Note that with quadratic cost functions á la Example 1, the expected
revenue of the seller in the standard auctions is equal to 1. This implies that
the ranking of the actions in this case is: 1. FPAA, 2. SPAA, 3. the standard
auctions. This observation sheds new light to the voluminous literature on
over/under dissipation of rents.12 In the current set up, when the value of
the prize is independent of bidders wealth, bidders risk aversion leads to
over-dissipation in the expected terms (see also the next section); on the
average, bidders consume more than they receive.
5 Remarks
5.1 FPAA under symmetric bidders
Assume that there are n symmetric players: c(·) = c1(·) = ... = cn(·). From
Propositions 2 and 3, the following corollary is immediate.
Corollary 3 Assume symmetric payoﬀ functions. In the maximal NE of
the FPAA generates revenue
Evf = n
µ
β −
Z β
0
c(b)
1
n−1 db
¶
. (12)
It is clear that in the standard auction the (unique) symmetric equilib-
rium generate bids ai = β for all i = 1, ..., n (in the Þrst price case this
is the unique equilibrium, in the second price case there are asymmetric
12See Konrad and Schlesinger (1997) and references therein.
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equilibria). Thus sellers payoﬀ is 1 under standard auction. By (12) it is
now straightforward to compare the all-pay auctions to the standard ones.
Note that if c(·) is linear, then Evf = β, which is equivalent to the equilib-
rium payoﬀ for the seller under the standard auction forms. This, of course,
follows also from the revenue equivalence theorem (e.g. Myerson 1981).
If c(·) is to interpreted as bidders utility function over wealth, then we
can say that bidders are risk averse, neutral, or loving if c is convex, linear,
or concave, respectively (note the sign of c). Note that with convex c(·) we
have c(b) ≤ b for all b ∈ [0,β], and with concave c(·) the direction of the
inequality is reversed. Thus, from (12) it is easy to deduce the following.
Corollary 4 The seller prefers, is indiﬀerent to, or does not prefer the
standard auctions over the FPAA if buyers are risk averse, neutral, or loving,
respectively.
It may be counter-intuitive that risk aversion makes the value of a ran-
domized transfer lower, not higher, in the expected terms. By the zero-proÞt
constraint of the bidders, this can be true only if other bidders strategies in
the convex case (Þrst order) stochastically dominate those in the linear case.
This implies higher expected values of the bids, and hence greater expected
revenues for the seller.
What about the eﬀect of the number of bidders? The next example
shows that sellers revenues always increases in the number of bidders, if the
cost functions are of Cobb-Douglas form, but not unboundedly.
Example 2 Suppose symmetric cost function satisÞes c1(b) = ... = cn(b) =
br, r > 0. Then β = 1 and
Evf = n
µ
1−
Z 1
0
b
r
n−1db
¶
=
nr
r + n− 1 .
As n becomes large,
lim
n→∞Ev
f =
r
limn→∞( rn +
n−1
n )
= r.
Thus with large number of symmetric bidders and Cobb-Douglas cost
functions, the exponential gives a good estimate of the revenues. This prop-
erty of the Þrst price all-pay auction can be very handy in applications. Note
also that as the number of bidder grows, the sellers revenues become less
risky.
5.2 Winning bid
Sometimes the social beneÞt from the allocation of the prize is dependent
of the winners investment. Then it may be of the interest of the seller to
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maximize the expected bid of the winner. Suppose the value of a worker to
a company is dependent on his work and educational history. Then it is in
the interest of a company to encourage potential employees to gain as much
relevant experiece as possible. The company prefers to employ a winner
with higher educational eﬀort b. Should the company allocate a job via the
Þrst or the second price all-pay auction?
Denote the expected winners action in a symmetric n−bidder Þrst and
second price all-pay auctions, respectively, by Ebf and Ebs. Assume β = 1.
We are interested in the case where the number of bidders is large.
Proposition 8 As the number of bidders become large, the expected bid of
the winner in the symmetric FPAA is
lim
n→∞Eb
f = 1−
Z 1
0
c(b)db,
and in the symmetric SPAA
lim
n→∞Eb
s =
Z ∞
0
e−c(b)db.
Proof. Denote by Σ(k) the cdf of the kth order statistic. By deÞnition,
Σ(1)(b) = Σn(b) for all b ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, in the FPAA
Σ(1)(b) = c(b)
n
n−1 .
Integrating by parts gives
Ebf =
Z 1
0
bdΣ(1)(b)
= lim
a→∞
Z a
0
(Σ(1)(a)−Σ(1)(b))db
=
Z 1
0
(1−Σ(1)(b))db
=
Z 1
0
(1− c(b) nn−1 )db.
Taking the limit n→∞ gives the result.
The second order statistic satisÞes Σ(2)(b) = nΣn−1(b)− (n− 1)Σn(b).13
In the SPAA,
Σ(2)(b) = n(1−e−c(b))n−1n−2 (1−(1−e−c(b)) 1n−1 )+(1−e−c(b)) nn−1 , for all b ∈ R+.
(13)
13See e.g. Krishna (2001), Appendix C.
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Note that Σ(2)(b) → 1 − e−c(b) as n → ∞, for all b. On the other hand, as
above,
Ebs =
Z ∞
0
bdΣ(2)(b)
=
Z ∞
0
(1−Σ(2)(b))db.
Inserting (13) and taking the pointwise limit as n→∞ gives the result.
Thus we obtain that even if the number of competitors becomes large,
the action taken by the winner does not increase without a bound, which is
to be contrasted with the standard auctions. In the risk neutral case c(b) = b
for all b, we have limn Ebf = 1/2 and limn Ebs = 1. In the quadratic case
c(b) = b2 for all b, we have limn Ebf = 2/3 and limn Ebs =
√
π/2. The
following corollary is immediate.
Corollary 5 The SPAA generates higher expected winners bid than the
FPAA when cost functions are linear or quadratic.
This means that with linear or qudratic cost functions, it should be in
the interest of a Þrm to select their workers through a war of attrition rather
than through a blind contest.
It should be noted, however, that with standard auctions the winners
bid is always 1. This is at least as high as the expected winners bid under
of the all-pay auctions. Moreover, this bid is riskless whereas winners bid
in all-pay auctions contains risk.
6 Closing remarks
This paper has investigated equilibria in complete information all-pay auc-
tions when cost functions of the bidder may be non-linear. Complete closed
chararacterization of the equilibria of the Þrst price all-pay auction and par-
tial but closed form chararacterization of the equilibria of the second price
all-pay auction is established. Also closed form expression of the sellers
revenues from the two auctions are derived. These results are then used to
conduct revenue comparisons, which is the main contribution of the paper.
It is shown that under linear cost functions the second price all-pay
auction generates at least as high revenue as the standard auction forms,
which in turn generate at least as high revenue as the Þrst price all-pay
auction. When marginal costs (or, equivalently, valuations for the object)
diﬀer, this ranking of auctions is strict. With quadratic cost functions,
however, the ordering of the Þrst and the second price all-pay auctions is
reversed, and both of them dominate the standard auctions. This suggests
that if the bidders are risk neutral, then the seller should prefer the second
17
price all-pay auction. However, if the bidders are risk averse, then the Þrst
price all-pay auction might be recommendable.
A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Necessity : Let (Σi)ni=1 constitute a NE, and let
(u∗i )
n
i=1 be the corresponding payoﬀ. Denote c
∗
i (b) = ci(b) + u
∗
i , for all b and
i. First, bidding more than β is dominated action for all i = 2, ..., n. Since
1 can guarantee payoﬀ 1−ψ1y(β) = (ψ2−ψ1)ψ−12 by bidding β + ε for any
ε > 0, we have u∗1 ≥ (ψ2−ψ1)ψ−12 . Denote the support14 of Σi by Si ⊆ [0,β].
Claim 0: There are no gaps in ∪j∈NSj .
Proof: If there was b ∈ (0,maxSj) for some j, but b 6∈ ∪j∈NSj , then
there is i that would strictly beneÞt from choosing b instead of b0 = inf{b00 ∈
Si : b
00 > b, i ∈ N}, as the lower bid would not aﬀect her winning probability
but would decrease her payments.
Claim 1: Let K = {j : b ∈ Sj}. Then K contains at least two elements.
Proof: By Claim 0, K is nonempty. If K = {i}, then, since a lower bid
does not aﬀect her winning probability but does decrease her payments, i
would strictly beneÞt from downgrading her bid by some ε > 0 (note that
Si is a closed set).
Claim 2: Suppose there is nonempty K 0 ⊂ N such that all Σk, k ∈ K 0,
contain an atom αk(b) > 0 at b. Then there is i 6∈ K 0such that Σi(b) = 0.
Proof: Under the supposition, there is i such that bidding b+ε, for any
ε > 0, increases his winning probability at least the amountY
j∈N\K0
Σj(b)
X
M⊆K0
1
#M
Y
j∈M
αj(b), (14)
whereas the increase in the cost is ci(b+ ε)− ci(b). By the continuity of ci,
the latter number goes to zero. Thus so does (14). This implies there is
i 6∈ K 0such that Σi(b) = 0.
Claim 3: inf ∪j∈NSj = 0.
Proof: If inf ∪j∈NSj > 0, then, by Claim 2, bidder i such that inf Si =
inf ∪j∈NSj would strictly beneÞt from choosing b = 0 rather than b ∈ Si, as
this change would not aﬀect his winning probability.
Claim 4: inf Si = 0 for all i = 1, ..., n.
Proof: Suppose there is i such that inf Si > 0. Then, since there are no
gaps in ∪j∈NSj and inf ∪j∈NSj = 0, there is bidder j and bid b such that
b ∈ Sj and b < inf Si. But this implies that i would strictly beneÞt from
bidding 0, as this change would not aﬀect his winning probability.
Claim 5: u∗j = 0 for all j ∈ {2, ..., n}.
14The smallest closed set S such that Σi(b)−Σi(b+ ε) > 0, for all ε > 0, for all b ∈ S.
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Proof: By Claims 2 and 4, there is i such that Σi(0) = 0. By Claim 4
we have u∗j = 0, for all j 6= i. Since u∗1 ≥ (c2 − c1)c−12 > 0, it must be that
i = 1.
Claim 6: If b ∈ ∩j∈KSj ∩ (0,β], then K ⊆ {1, ...,m}.
Proof: Suppose not. Then by Claim 5, for all b ∈ ∩j∈KSj ,Y
j∈K\{i}
Σj(b)− ci(b) = 0, for all i ∈ {2, ...,m}, andY
j∈K\{k}
Σj(b)− ck(b) = 0, for some k ∈ {m+ 1, ..., n}.
Take b¯ = supSk. Then, since Σk(b¯) = 1 ≥ Σi(b¯) and ck > ci for all i = 2, ...m,
we have Y
j∈K\{i}
Σj(b¯)− ci(b) >
Y
j∈K\{i}
Σj(b¯)− ck(b¯)
≥
Y
j∈K\{k}
Σj(b¯)− ck(b¯)
= 0.
This violates Claim 5.
Claim 7: DeÞne correspondence K : [0, 1]→ N such that
K(b) =
i ∈ N : Y
j∈N\{i}
Σj(b)− c∗i (b) = 0
 , for all b.
Then K(·) is upper hemi-continuous on (0,β].
Proof: Take a converging sequence bν → b and k such that k ∈ K(bν)
for all ν.15 We claim k ∈ K(b). NowY
j∈N\{k}
Σj(b
ν)− ck(bν) = u∗i
Since Σj contains no atoms on (0,β], it is continuous in this range. Moreover,
since ck is continuous, the left hand side converges to u∗i . Thus the equality
holds for b, too, and hence k ∈ K(b).
Claim 8: If i ∈ K(b) ∩ {2, ...,m}, b ∈ (0,β], then i ∈ K(b0), b0 ∈ (b,β].
Proof: Suppose there is an interval (b0, b00) such that i ∈ K(b0)∩K(b00)∩
{2, ...,m} but i 6∈ K(b) for b ∈ (b0, b00). Then Σi(b) = Σi(b0) = Σi(b00) for all
b ∈ (b0, b00). Note that, for any b,Y
j∈N
Σj(b)− c∗i (b)Σi(b) = 0, for all i ∈ K(b). (15)
15Or equivalently a converging kν → k such that kν ∈ K(bν) for all ν.
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Consequently
Σj(b) =
Ã
c∗i (b)
c∗j (b)
!
Σi(b), for all i, j ∈ K(b). (16)
In particular,
Σj(b) = Σi(b), for all i, j ∈ K(b) ∩ {2, ...,m}. (17)
Take sequence bν converging to b0 from upwards such that k ∈ K(bν) ∩
{2, ...,m} and bν < b00 for all ν. Then, since K is uhc by Claim 8, k ∈ K(b0).
By (17), Σk(bν) ≥ Σi(bν) = Σi(b0) for all ν. Since i 6∈ K(bν),Y
j∈N\{i}
Σj(b
ν)− ci(bν) < 0 =
Y
j∈N\{k}
Σj(b
ν)− ck(bν),
or Σk(bν) < Σi(bν), a contradiction.
Now, since Si contains no gaps on (0,β], it can only have a gap of form
(0,λi]. Thus K(b) ⊆ K(b0) for all b0 ≥ b. Since K contains at least two
elements in (0,β], there is i ∈ {2, ...,m} such that i ∈ limb→0K(b). By (15)
and (16),Y
j∈N\{i}
Σj(b) = Σi(b)
|K(b)|−1 Y
j∈K(b)\{i}
c∗i (b)
c∗j (b)
Y
j∈{1,...,m}\K(b)
Σj(b)
= c∗i (b), for all i ∈ K.
Dividing and rearranging
Σi(a) =
c∗i (b) Y
j∈K(b)\{i}
c∗j (b)
c∗i (b)
Y
j∈{1,...,m}\K(b)
1
Σj(b)
 1|K(b)|−1 , for all i ∈ K(b).
(18)
In particular, for i 6= 1, we have
c∗i (b)
Y
j∈K(b)\{i}
c∗j (b)
c∗i (b)
Y
j∈{1,...,m}\K(b)
1
Σj(b)
=
c∗1(b)Q
j∈{1,...,m}\K(b)Σj(b)
, . (19)
Claim 9: If 1 ∈ K(b0) ∩K(b00), then 1 ∈ K(b) for all b ∈ (b0, b00), for all
b0, b00 ∈ [0,β].
Proof: Suppose there is a b0 < b00 such that 1 ∈ K(b0)∩K(b00) but i 6∈ K(b)
for b ∈ (b0, b00). Take sequence bν ∈ (b0, b00) converging to b0. Since 1 6∈ K(bν),
his payoﬀ is, by (18),Y
j∈N\{1}
Σj(b
ν)− c∗1(bν) =
c2(b
ν)
Σ1(bν)
− c∗1(bν) =
c2(b
ν)
Σ1(b0)
− c∗1(bν).
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Recall that, by Claim 5, c∗j (b) = cj(b) for all j ∈ {2, ...,m} and that c∗1(b) =
c1y(b) + u
∗
1. Since 1 ∈ K(b0) and cj s are continuous, this number converges
to zero. Thus
c2(b
0)
c∗1(b0)
= Σ1(b
0). (20)
Similarly, take sequence in (b0, b00) converging to b00. Then, by continuity,
c2(b
00)
c∗1(b00)
= Σ1(b
00). (21)
Since Σ1(b0) = Σ1(b00), we have
1
c1 +
u∗1
y(b0)
=
1
c1 +
u∗1
y(b00)
.
But this can hold only if y(b0) = y(b00). Since y is increasing, this implies
b0 = b00, a contradiction.
Claim 10: supS1 = β and u∗1 = (c2 − c1)c−12 .
Proof. Let supS1 = b¯. Since Σ1 is a cdf, we have Σ1(b¯) = 1. Since
u∗1 ≥ (c2−c1)c−12 , necessarily b¯ ≤ β. Suppose b¯ < β. By (20) c2(b¯) = c∗1(b¯) or
c2y(b¯) = c1y(b¯) + u
∗
1.
Therefore
y(b¯) =
u∗1
c2 − c1 ≥
1
c2
.
Since y is an increasing function, this implies b¯ ≥ β, a contradiction. Since
b¯ = β, we have u∗1 = (c2 − c1)c−12 .
By Claims 5 and 10 we now have c∗i = ci for all i = 1, ..., n. Rank bidders
{2, ...,m} according their inf Sis. Rename the lowest ranked bidder 2, the
second lowest ranked by 3, and so on. Choose λ1 = inf S1, and λj = inf Sj
for all j = 1, 2, ...,m. Then, by Claim 1, λ1 = λ2 = 0 ≤ λ3 ≤ ... ≤ λm. Thus,
by (18) we have constructed strategies (Σi) of form (2).
The remaining task is to construct the atoms at b = 0. Let k be the
number of active bidders, i.e. λk < β. Then λk = max{λj : λj < 1, j =
1, ...,m}. Then Σj(0) = αj(0) = 1 for all j = k+1, ...,m. Since c∗j (b) = c2(b)
for all j = 2, ..., k and
Q
j∈k+1,...,mΣj(b) = 1, we have, by (18),
αk(0) =
ci(b) k−1Y
j∈1
cj(b)
ci(b)
 1k−1 = c1(λk)k−1.
Then
αk−1(0) =
µ
c1(λk)
αk(0)
¶ 1
k−2
,
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and, inductively,
αk0(0) =
Ã
c1(λk0)Qk
j=k0+1 αj(0)
! 1
k0−1
.
Suﬃciency: Suppose that (Σi)ni=1 satisÞes (18) for some K. It suﬃces
to show there is no proÞtable deviation by k ∈ N \K. Suppose there is a
proÞtable bid b > 0 for k. Bidding over β is clearly dominated. ThenY
j∈K\{i}
Σj(b)− c2(b) = 0.
Since ks deviation is proÞtableY
j∈K
Σj(b)− ck(b) > 0.
By assumption ci(b) ≤ ck(b). But this impliesY
j∈K
Σj(b) > ck(b) ≥
Y
j∈K\{i}
Σj(b),
or Σi(b) > 1, a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 4. We prove only if statement with k = 0,
other cases are analogous. Let ψ1 = ... = ψl < ψl+1 ≤ ψm, for some l ∈
{1, ...,m−1}, and suppose (Σi)ni=1 is a NE where 1, ...,m bidders completely
mixes. We want to show m = l + 1.
For any b ∈ R+, deÞne the probability of i winning
Gi(b) =
mY
j=1
j 6=i
Σj(b).
Since the strategy is completely mixed,Z ai
0
(1−ci(b))dGi(b)−ci(ai)(1−Gi(ai)) = 0, for all ai ∈ R+, for all i ∈ {1, ...,m}.
(22)
Taking the derivative,
G0i(ai)−c0i(ai)(1−Gi(ai)) = 0, for all ai ∈ R+, for all i ∈ {1, ...,m}. (23)
Thus,
ci(ai) =
Z ai
0
G0i(b)
1−Gi(b)db = − ln(1−Gi(ai)),
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or
Gi(ai) = 1− e−ci(ai). (24)
Thus,
Σj(ai) =
Ã
1− e−ci(ai)
1− e−cj(ai)
!
Σi(ai).
Inserting this into (24) gives
Σi(ai) =
ÃQ
j 6=i(1− e−cj(ai))
(1− e−ci(ai))n−2
! 1
n−1
=
(1− e−ci(ai)) mY
i=1
j 6=i
1− e−cj(ai)
1− e−ci(ai)

1
n−1
, for all i ∈ {1, ...,m}
establishing (7).
Since Σk is a cdf and right continuous, the derivative of Σk exists and is
nonnegative everywhere. Thus, for all a ∈ R+ and for all k = 1, ...,m,
d
da
ÃQm
j=1(1− e−ψjy(a))
(1− e−ψky(a))m−1
!
(25)
=
Pm
i=1 ψiy
0(a)e−ψiy(a)
Q
j 6=i(1− e−ψjy(a))
(1− e−ψky(a))m−1 − (m− 1)ψky
0(a)e−ψky(a)
Qm
j=1(1− e−ψjy(a))
(1− e−ψky(a))m−2
=
y0(a)
(1− e−ψky(a))m−2
Pmi=1 ψie−ψiQj 6=i(1− e−ψjy(a))
1− e−ψky(a) − (m− 1)ψke
−ψk
mY
j=1
(1− e−ψjy(a))

=
y0(a)
Qm
j=1(1− e−ψjy(a))
(1− e−ψky(a))m−2
Ã
mX
i=1
ψie
−ψiy(a)
(1− e−ψky(a))(1− e−ψiy(a)) − (m− 1)ψke
−ψky(a)
!
=
y0(a)
Qm
j=1(1− e−ψjy(a))e−ψky(a)
(1− e−ψky(a))m−2
Ã
mX
i=1
ψie
(ψk−ψi)y(a)
(1− e−ψky(a))(1− e−ψiy(a)) − (m− 1)ψk
!
≥ 0
Letting k = 1 and a→∞ we have
lim
a→∞
mX
i=1
ψie
(ψ1−ψi)y(a)
(1− e−ψ1y(a))(1− e−ψiy(a)) = lψ1.
This number is at least (m − 1)c1 (if and) only if l + 1 ≥ m. Since l ∈
{1, ...,m− 1}, the weak inequality holds as equality.
To establish the if part, it suﬃces to check that (i) no bidderm+1, ..., n
beneÞts from deviation, and (ii) Σi is a cdf. For the Þrst part, since ψi ≥ ψm
for all i = m, ..., n, it is clear thatZ ai
0
(1−ci(b))dGi(b)−ci(ai)(1−Gi(ai)) ≤ 0, for all ai ∈ R+, for all i ∈ {m, ..., n}.
Thus bidding zero is optimal for all i = m, ..., n. For the second part, by
(25), Σi is increasing. Thus it suﬃces that limb→∞Σi(b) = 1, which indeed
is the case.
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